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1 Introduction
Intergovernmental grants are an important resource for subnational govern-
ments. Many of these grants are conditional, which means that the recipient
can only spend the grant on one particular purpose (e.g., welfare-to-work
programs). A conditional grant can be a block grant or a matching grant.
In the former case the recipient gets a fixed amount of money, in the latter
case the donor finances a fixed share of the recipient’s expenditures. A grant
can also be unconditional, which means that the recipient can decide how to
spend it. A conditional grant is beneficial if the expenditures of the recipient
also benefit others and the recipient does not take these spillover benefits
into account. For an overview of conditional intergovernmental grants and
data on their importance see, e.g., Oates (1999), Bergvall, Charbit, Kraan,
and Merk (2006), Huber and Runkel (2006), and Boadway and Shah (2007).
There is a large literature on how subnational governments spend condi-
tional grants. As economic theory suggests, after receiving the grant, sub-
national governments’ total spending on the specific purpose often increases
by a lower amount than the size of the grant since the grant is crowding
out other resources that were spent on this purpose before the grant was
received. This is known as the fungibility effect (see, e.g., McGuire (1978),
Zampelli (1986), Gordon (2004), and Evans and Owens (2007)). Another
finding in the literature is that although this crowding out takes place, it is
often smaller than what economic theory predicts. Subnational governments
spend a larger part of the grant on the specific purpose than expected. This is
called the flypaper effect (see, e.g., Hines and Thaler (1995) for an overview).
In this paper, we take a different perspective and do not study how subna-
tional governments spend a conditional block grant, but whether they spend
it. In practice, it occurs regularly that recipients do not fully use conditional
block grants. For example, recipients do not use large parts of several condi-
tional block grants of the European Union (European Commission (2011a))
(more details and other examples follow below).1 We study the case in which
the Dutch national government provides a conditional block grant to munici-
palities to finance welfare-to-work programs. A welfare-to-work program can
1 Others study situations in which subnational governments reject a grant because
their policy goals interfere with the conditions of the grant (e.g., a grant for abstinence-
only education). Another related question is whether subnational governments apply and
lobby for grants. See, for example, Chernick (1979), Stein (1979, 1981), Foster (1981),
Rich (1989), Schneider and Ji (1990), Knight (2002), Bickers and Stein (2004), Volden
(2007), Craw (2010), and Doan and McFarlane (2012). In our setting, however, policy
goals of the national and subnational government do not fundamentally differ and the
subnational government automatically receives the grant.
2
be (almost) anything that helps residents of a municipality to find a job. It
can even be a (temporary) public service job. Municipalities have a direct
benefit from (successful) programs since they are financially responsible for
social assistance. If municipalities do not fully spend the grant, they have
to transfer the surplus back to the national government. You might expect
that municipalities are very eager to spend the grant: they get “free money”
for programs and they can use the money that they save on social assistance
in any way they wish.2 However, many municipalities spend the grant only
partially.
We argue that there exist costs for municipalities to use the conditional
block grant and we estimate these hidden costs. The central message of this
paper is that municipalities do not fully spend their grant because the costs of
using it outweigh the benefits at high spending levels.3 First, we emphasize
that a program is not completely free for a municipality. The costs of a
welfare-to-work program consist of direct and indirect costs. Direct costs
are the costs of the actual program that an individual participant receives.
These are, for example, the amount of wage subsidy or the course fee. Indirect
costs are all other costs of the program. These are, for example, the cost of
selecting a suitable participant, deciding on the appropriate type of program
for the participant, procurement of the program, and monitoring the program
participant and the company that carries out the program, but also the costs
of cleaning civil servants’ offices and heating the city hall. Municipalities can
only use their grant to finance direct costs. They can assign these costs to
an individual participant and thereby prove to the national government that
these costs result from a welfare-to-work program. However, municipalities
cannot use the grant for indirect costs since they cannot assign these costs
to an individual participant and therefore it is more difficult to check for
the national government whether these costs really result from a program.
Municipalities have to pay indirect costs from their own resources.4
2 See, e.g., Divosa (2006), Van Geuns, Mallee, Soethout, Van Waveren, and Wissink
(2006), and Berkhout and Mallee (2008).
3 Stein (1979, 1981) mentions three types of costs that subnational governments possibly
incur in case they are seeking and receiving a grant: costs of applying for the grant, costs of
implementing the grant, and opportunity costs (the costs of curtailing other expenditures
due to the costs of application and implementation). Stein hypothesizes that if these costs
are high, subnational governments seek grants less frequently. We focus on the costs of
using the grant (i.e., the costs of implementing the grant and the opportunity costs) as
municipalities do not have to apply for the grant that we study.
4 In the case of federal funded research grants in the United States there exists a similar
distinction between direct costs (e.g., personnel and equipment during the project) and
indirect costs (e.g., university libraries and building maintenance). Direct costs are easy
to assign to a specific project, indirect costs of a project are difficult to measure (see, e.g.,
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Second, we show that if these indirect costs are sufficiently high, then it
is optimal for a municipality not to spend the grant completely. In that case,
the marginal costs of using an additional euro of the grant are higher than the
marginal benefits (the lower expenditures on social assistance that it causes).
The intuition behind this result is as follows. If the indirect costs increase,
then a municipality spends less of the grant than the national government
wishes since a decrease in expenditures on programs costs a municipality less
than the national government due to spillover benefits of programs (after all,
these spillover benefits are the reason that the national government provides
a conditional grant).
Third, we estimate the indirect costs. We start by estimating the revenues
of using the grant via municipality-specific data on program expenditures and
outflow from social assistance. Afterward, we combine this information with
municipality-specific data on grants and numerically solve our model. The
solution of the model is the level of indirect costs at which the decision that
maximizes the municipality’s profit is most similar to the real decision of the
municipality. As a robustness check, we also estimate costs via a simplified
model that has an analytical solution. We find that for each euro of the grant
that a municipality uses, it has to add on average about 90 cents from its own
resources. Therefore, we conclude that the national government provides de
facto a closed-ended matching grant instead of a conditional block grant: the
grant is finite and implicitly requires matching.5
We think that the situation where recipients do not (fully) use a condi-
tional block grant because of indirect costs is not unique to the case that we
May and Sarson (1999)). In spite of this, federal funded research grants (partly) cover
indirect costs. However, it will always be difficult to determine what are legitimate and
illegitimate indirect costs. Possibly, this is a reason that many other research grants do not
cover indirect costs. In these cases, universities have to pay indirect costs from their own
resources. Indirect costs are about 30% of the total costs of research (Goldman, Williams,
Adamson, and Rosenblatt (2000)).
5 Chernick (1979, 1981) also argues that a conditional block grant can implicitly be
a matching grant. In his model, recipients apply for a conditional block grant and the
donor awards grants to those recipients that are willing to finance a larger part of the
project themselves. Therefore, the donor actually provides a matching grant. Chernick
also empirically tests this model using the HUD Basic Water and Sewer grant and finds
a positive relationship between the size of the grant that recipients receive and their
own contribution. Thus, next to implicit costs of using a grant, there can also exist
implicit costs of applying for a grant (see also Footnote 3). Also Stein (1979) shows the
importance of costs of applying since he finds that communities that apply more often for
some specific matching grants, have more active and developed planning structures (e.g.,
a planning body and a high number of planners). For similar evidence see, for example,
Collins and Gerber (2006, 2008) and Hall (2008a,b), and also Okten and Weisbrod (2000)
and Reinhardt (2006).
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study. An example of a conditional block grant of the European Union that
recipients just use partially, although they would have benefits if they would
spend more of it, is the instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA). In 2010,
candidate and potential member states of the European Union use only 82%
of the committed amount (this is an underimplementation of 323 million eu-
ros) (European Commission (2011a)). Also in this case, implicit co-financing
might be important. For example, the European Commission (2011a, p. 14-
15) mentions that recipients do not always have the administrative capacity
that is required for receiving grants. Recipients need to develop plans and
also need proper (financial) reporting to prove that money is spent on the
purpose of the grant. Many universities receive conditional block grants from
the European Union as well. The European University Association notes that
also these grants regularly require implicit co-financing (Estermann and Pru-
vot (2011, p. 52)). For example, it can occur that a university can use a grant
to build a lecture-hall, but not the accompanying parking space, while the
university cannot choose not to build the parking space.6 To encourage uni-
versities to use these European grants, some national governments provide
additional grants to universities to cover the indirect costs.7
Hickey (2001) provides another example: the underspending of HIV/AIDS
conditional block grants by South African provinces. In the financial year
2000−2001, provinces spend only 36.5% of these grants, although HIV/AIDS
is a large problem. Also Hickey (2001) mentions a lack of administrative
capacity of recipients as a reason for the underspending. Administrative ca-
pacity is costly for provinces. Moreover, provinces bear costs that result from
fighting HIV/AIDS, but that are too intertwined with regular health costs
to use conditional funding to finance them (Hickey (2002, p. 600)). There-
fore, provinces incur expenses to use the grant. To cover these costs and
thereby address the underspending, South African provinces receive since
2002 an additional unconditional block grant with the request to spend it
on HIV/AIDS. Hickey and Ndlovu (2005) argue that due to this additional
grant, spending on HIV/AIDS increased drastically.
One more example are funds that support education of employees in spe-
6 In a similar vein, Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990) argue that also certain forms of
foreign aid and IMF programs look like conditional block grants, but in fact contain
an implicit matching component because of, for example, required policy changes that
generate additional expenditures for the recipient. See also McGuire (1978), Chubb (1985),
Brennan and Pincus (1990), and Singhal (2008) for a discussion on explicit and implicit
conditions of grants.
7 The Canadian government also provides a grant that complements other federal
research grants by covering the indirect costs of research (Government of Canada (2010)).
For the situation in the United States, see, e.g., the references in Footnote 4.
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cific sectors in the Netherlands (so-called O&O funds). Most funds finance
costs of courses via conditional block grants to employers (De Mooij and
Houtkoop (2005, p. 60)). Although educational programs are beneficial for
employers, they do not use a large part of the available amount of money (for
financial details see Waterreus (2002) and De Mooij and Houtkoop (2005)).
A general explanation for this insufficient use is that employers have implicit
costs of using grants, for example, opportunity costs of working, travelling
costs, and reluctance of employees to follow courses.
A final example is from organizational economics. General managers of-
ten finance departments of their organization via conditional block grants
for, among others, conferences and education. In many organizations, de-
partments do not fully use these grants. Obviously, it is for the department
and its employees attractive to attend conferences or follow courses, but the
implicit cost that the department and its employees have to bear is that it
is not possible to do other work at the same time. Therefore, the (implicit)
marginal costs can outweigh the marginal benefits and the grant may not be
fully spent.
The underlying idea of our approach and findings is related to the afore-
mentioned literature on the fungibility effect. McGuire (1978) argues that a
grant that a donor officially labels as conditional can be partly unconditional
in practice. Based on data on expenditures of U.S. local governments, he
estimates the effect of an educational grant on the local government’s bud-
get constraint and he finds that about 70% of the grant is fungible. Hence,
McGuire argues that a conditional grant can be even better for a recipient
than it looks at first sight. We argue that it is also possible that a recipi-
ent has to sacrifice unconditional resources to use a conditional block grant.
Therefore, in our case, the grant is less attractive for the recipient than it
looks at first sight. Of course, a conditional block grant can be fungible and
can require own resources at the same time.
We certainly do not claim that high costs of using a grant is the only
reason that conditional block grants are not always fully spent. For exam-
ple, in our case, policy makers and other parties involved also mention other
reasons, like careful budgeting by municipalities (see also Stein (1984)) and
disappointing results of programs of which the price depended on job place-
ments (see, e.g., the references in Footnote 2). We think that the existence
of costs of using a grant is only one, but a general, explanation for the insuf-
ficient use of conditional block grants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
institutions and deliberates on the revenues and costs of using the grant.
Section 3 presents a simple model to analyze the impact of indirect costs on
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the decision of a municipality to use the grant. Section 4 brings this model
to the data and estimates the indirect costs. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutions
Municipalities annually receive a conditional block grant for welfare-to-work
programs from the national government. The total grant is 1.6 billion euros
in 2008.8 The share of this total that a municipality receives is a function
of municipality-specific characteristics (for example, the number of social
assistance recipients and their level of education) and its welfare-to-work
expenditures in 2003.9 In 2008, there are 443 municipalities with in total
269, 000 social assistance recipients that are younger than 65 (source: Statis-
tics Netherlands).10 A welfare-to-work program can be (almost) anything
that helps these social assistance recipients to find a job. This help can be
schooling or assistance with applications, but also a wage subsidy or even
a full-time public service job like a security officer or a cleaner. In 2008,
municipalities spend approximately 35% of the total welfare-to-work expen-
ditures on subsidized employment, 25% on job search guidance, 20% on wage
subsidies, and 10% on education (Divosa (2009)).11
If a welfare-to-work program is successful and a person leaves social as-
sistance, then the gain for the municipality is that it does not have to pay
a benefit to this person anymore. The national government finances expen-
ditures of municipalities on social assistance benefits via an unconditional
block grant, so the municipality can use the money it saves in any way it
wishes. Since municipalities can even directly finance jobs from the grant for
welfare-to-work programs, the marginal revenue of spending a euro of this
grant is always positive. The expenditures of a municipality have positive
externalities since also the national government benefits if a person leaves
social assistance. Not only can it lower the aforementioned unconditional
8 To put this amount in context, in 2008, the total unconditional block grant that
municipalities receive for social assistance benefits for people that are younger than 65
equals 3.7 billion euros and the Dutch GDP is 596 billion euros (source: Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment and Statistics Netherlands).
9 The current system exists since 2004. See, e.g., Ministry of Social Affairs and Em-
ployment (2006, 2008) for background information.
10 Many employees that lose their job can claim unemployment insurance first (the
maximum duration of this benefit is individual-specific and varies between 3 months and
5 years during the sample period). Therefore, relatively many social assistance recipients
are already unemployed for a longer period.
11 For an overview of the literature on evaluations of active labor market policies see,
e.g., Card, Kluve, and Weber (2010) and Kluve (2010).
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block grant that it gives a municipality for social assistance benefits in the
long run, but it also receives income taxes and more indirect taxes. More-
over, it saves on many other income dependent subsidies like, for example,
rent subsidies, health care subsidies, and student grants.
A municipality can use the grant for welfare-to-work programs to finance
a program.12 However, this conditional block grant only covers a part of
the costs. The total costs consist of direct and indirect costs. Direct costs
are the costs of the actual program that an individual participant receives,
like the amount of wage subsidy or the course fee. Indirect costs are all
other costs. For example, a municipality incurs expenses for selecting social
assistance recipients for which a program is useful (“profiling”), for finding
a right program for these candidates (“targeting”), for procurement of a
program, and for monitoring program participants and the company that
carries out the program (see Berkhout and Mallee (2008)). Moreover, it also
has more general indirect costs like maintenance of the building in which civil
servants work. A municipality can use the grant for direct costs, but not
for indirect costs. Since the grant is conditional, the national government
wants a municipality to prove that it really uses the grant for welfare-to-
work programs. A municipality has to assign costs to an individual program
participant to use the grant. It can easily do this for direct costs, but this
is difficult for indirect costs. Therefore, it has to finance indirect costs from
its own resources. The national government cannot sufficiently distinguish
indirect costs from costs that do not result from welfare-to-work programs
to allow municipalities to use the conditional block grant to finance them.
If a municipality could also use the grant for indirect costs, then the grant
would not be conditional.13
If a municipality does not (fully) use the grant for welfare-to-work pro-
grams, it can save a part of the grant for future years. However, the total
12 Next to the standard grant from the national government, a municipality may receive
additional conditional grants for welfare-to-work programs (for example, via the European
Social Fund). Van Geuns, Mallee, Soethout, Van Waveren, and Wissink (2006, p. 22)
estimate that the size of these grants is 5% to 6% of the grant a municipality receives from
the national government and that 40% to 50% of the municipalities receive such a grant.
In our analysis, we assume that the grant of the national government is the only grant a
municipality receives (since this is the only grant that we observe).
13 The national government also gives an annual unconditional block grant for all kinds of
general expenditures like roads and the fire department (the so-called municipality fund).
It labels a part of this grant for the indirect costs of social assistance and welfare-to-work
programs, although it does not know these costs exactly (see Ministry of Social Affairs
and Employment (2008, p. 36)). In 2008, this part is in total 1.5 billion euros (Cebeon
(2010, p. 10)). See, e.g., Kok, Hollanders, and Hop (2006, p. 17), Kuhry and Jonker (2007,
p. 89), and Cebeon (2010) for a discussion and estimations of indirect costs.
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savings can never exceed 75% of the current grant. Any remaining money
flows back to the national government. Similarly, if a municipality spends
more than the grant, it can transfer these expenditures to future years. These
borrowings can in total never be larger than 75% of the current grant. A
municipality has to pay any remaining deficits from its own resources.14
3 Theory
In this section, we study the expenditure level that a municipality chooses
when it receives the conditional block grant. We show that if the indirect
costs of programs are sufficiently high, then it is optimal for a municipality
not to fully use the grant.
We model the relation between the national government and one munici-
pality (the national government has with each municipality such a relation).
In reality, a municipality can move parts of the grant back and forth in time
(see Section 2). To clearly present the effects, however, we assume a static
setting in this section. The municipality can (partially) use the grant or it
can (partially) give it back. Later on, we allow for saving and borrowing.
Moreover, we assume that the municipality cares only about its own revenues
and costs, while the national government cares about the revenues and costs
of itself and the municipality. In practice, the national government finances
the municipality for the most part (Allers (2009)). Furthermore, if the mu-
nicipality would care about the national government like it cares about itself,
then a conditional grant would not be necessary since the municipality would
already take the decision that the national government wishes without any
incentive. Finally, to keep the model simple, we assume in this section that
the national government’s estimate of the indirect costs (see Footnote 13) is
correct.15 We do not make any assumption on the knowledge of the national
government regarding the indirect costs in the empirical part of the paper.
The total revenues (TR) and marginal revenues (MR) of expenditures on
welfare-to-work-programs are for the national government (ng) and munici-
pality (m) respectively:
14 Each month, the national government transfers a twelfth of the annual grant to a
special checking account. A municipality can transfer money from this account to its
regular accounts. The special checking account cannot have a negative balance. If a
municipality borrows, then it has to temporarily finance this amount. In our analysis, we
assume that a municipality does not receive interest on its savings and that it does not
pay interest on its borrowings.
15 An alternative assumption in this section could be that the national government ig-
nores the indirect costs. This assumption is less realistic and leads sooner to the conclusion
that underspending exists. We will come back to this point in Footnote 18.
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TRng = α log (U + 1) MRng =
α
U + 1
TRm = β log (U + 1) MRm =
β
U + 1
where U is the amount of money the municipality spends on actual welfare-to-
work-programs (U ≥ 0). These expenditures have decreasing returns. The
effect of 1 euro of programs on the probability that a person leaves social
assistance differs between social assistance recipients. The municipality first
spends money on recipients for which the probability increases a lot, then on
recipients for which the effect is smaller. The national government gains more
from expenditures than the municipality (see Section 2). Therefore, α > β >
0. Spillover benefits are larger at lower expenditure levels. Social assistance
recipients for which the effect of 1 euro of programs is larger, also give higher
additional revenues to the national government. Their expected income rises
more after spending the euro than the expected income of persons of which
the euro has a smaller effect. Thus, the expected increase in tax payments
of these persons is larger, just like the expected decrease in their need for
income dependent subsidies.
The total costs (TC ) and marginal costs (MC ) of welfare-to-work pro-
grams are:
TC = (1 + x)U MC = (1 + x)
The total costs consist of the costs of the actual programs (direct costs, U)
and indirect costs of programs (xU) (see Section 2). We assume that indirect
costs are a fraction x of the costs of actual programs (x ≥ 0).16 The munic-
ipality chooses its spending on actual programs such that MRm = MC and
as a result U∗ = (β/(1 + x))− 1. However, the national government wants
that the municipality chooses U such that MRng = MC, which corresponds
to Ung = (α/(1 + x))− 1. Thus, the national government wants that the mu-
nicipality spends more than what it currently does (Ung > (β/(1 + x))− 1).
To accomplish an increase, it gives the municipality a conditional block grant
16 Alternatively, we could assume that the indirect costs depend on the level of U .
However, it is a priori not clear what this relation would be. In practice, it seems that
some types of indirect costs are higher if a municipality already has spent a lot on actual
programs (e.g., it is harder to find a new appropriate participant). Other types of indirect
costs, however, may be lower in this case (e.g., civil servants have more experience in
the procurement of programs). Furthermore, a more complex cost function substantially
increases the required number of computations in the next section. For these reasons,
we assume that indirect costs are a constant fraction of U . Another possibility is the
existence of (indirect) fixed costs. These do not impact the conclusions in this section. In
the empirical part of the paper, one of our estimates is robust to the existence of (indirect)
fixed costs.
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G for welfare-to-work programs (G ≥ 0). Since the grant is conditional, the
municipality can only use the grant for expenditures of which it can prove
that it incurs these for the purpose of the grant. Therefore, the municipality
can only use the grant to finance expenditures on actual programs, not to
finance indirect costs (see Section 2). As a result, the total and marginal
costs of the municipality are now:
TCGm = xU + (U −G) IU>G MCGm =
{
x if U ≤ G
1 + x if U > G
where IU>G is an indicator function taking the value 1 if its argument is true
and 0 otherwise. If U ≤ G, the municipality’s marginal costs of U equal the
indirect costs. It uses the grant to cover the costs of actual programs. If
U > G, then the municipality already exhausted the grant and its marginal
costs of U equal the costs of the actual programs plus the indirect costs.17
The national government sets G = Ung. Hereafter, we will prove that this
level of the grant is optimal for the national government.
Figure 1 depicts the marginal revenues and marginal costs of both the
national government and the municipality at varying levels of U . The level
of U that the municipality chooses, and thus also whether it uses the grant
completely, depends on the level of the indirect costs. If the indirect costs
are 0 or relatively low, then the municipality uses the whole grant. However,
if the indirect costs are relatively high, then the municipality does not use
the whole grant.
We define x̃ as the highest level of the indirect costs at which the munici-
pality still uses the whole grant. That is, the level of x at which MRm = MC
G
m







Now, we can distinguish two scenarios. First, we consider the scenario where
x ≤ x̃. Figure 1 shows this situation. In this case, the municipality chooses
17 We could also explicitly divide the indirect costs of programs into two types: indirect
costs that also exist if the municipality uses its own resources instead of the grant (e.g.,
costs of selecting program participants) and indirect costs that only exist if the municipality
uses the grant (e.g., administrative costs of proving that money is spent on the purpose
of the grant). In this section, we assume for simplicity that all indirect costs are of the
first type (i.e., the indirect costs are not higher if the municipality uses the grant than if
it uses its own resources). In practice, the first type of costs seem to be much larger than
the second type. In the empirical part of the paper, we implicitly include both types of
costs.
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Figure 1: The municipality fully spends the grant if indirect costs are rela-

















U∗ = G. The municipality does not spend more than G on actual programs
if (see also Figure 1):
β
G+ 1
≤ 1 + x (2)
This condition always holds since it is equivalent to α ≥ β. More intuitively,
G is the optimal level of spending on actual programs for the national gov-
ernment. Since the municipality has lower marginal revenues than the na-
tional government, it is never optimal for the municipality to choose a higher
amount than G if it has to bear the full marginal costs.
The municipality spends more on actual programs than it would do in
the situation without a grant (G > (β/(1 + x))− 1). In fact, if the indirect
costs are 0 or relatively low, the municipality chooses the amount that the




= 1 if x ≤ x̃
Second, we consider the scenario where x > x̃. Figure 2 shows this
scenario. The municipality chooses U such that MRm = MC
G
m . As a re-
sult, U∗ = (β/x)− 1. Although this amount is higher than the amount
the municipality would choose if there would not be a grant ((β/x)− 1 >
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Figure 2: The municipality does not fully spend the grant if indirect costs



















(β/(1 + x))− 1), it is lower than the amount that the national government














< 1 if x > x̃
Because the indirect costs are higher than in the first scenario, the national
government wants fewer programs and thus it lowers the grant (see Figure 2).
However, programs are also less attractive for the municipality in this sce-
nario. The decrease that the municipality wants is even larger than the
decrease that the national government wishes. As a result, the municipality
does not use the whole grant anymore. Moreover, as indirect costs become
larger, the municipality uses a smaller part of the grant. More formally,
∂(fraction spent)
∂x
< 0 if x > x̃
Intuitively, a decrease in the municipality’s spending on actual programs costs
the national government more than the municipality (in Figure 2, MRng
is steeper than MRm given a certain level of U). Therefore, if for both
marginal costs rise by the same amount (that occurs if x rises), then the
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national government wants to decrease the spending on actual programs less
than the municipality. The grant decreases less than the expenditures of the
municipality on actual programs. Consequently, the part of the grant that
the municipality uses decreases.18
What basically causes that the municipality does not fully use the grant,
is that the nature of the grant changes if there exist costs of using it. The
conditional block grant becomes in fact a closed-ended matching grant. The
national government finances only a part of the total costs of the munici-
pality. Moreover, it specifies beforehand the maximum amount that it will
contribute.
Anyhow, the grant has the effect that the national government desires.
The municipality increases its expenditures compared to the situation with-
out the grant. Moreover, it never spends more than what the national gov-
ernment wants.19 Appendix A shows that the current level of the conditional
block grant is optimal for the national government. The expenditure level
that the municipality chooses at a different level of the grant differs at least
as much from the expenditure level that the national government wishes as
the current expenditure level. The national government could solve the in-
sufficient use of the grant in case of x > x̃ by giving a closed-ended matching
grant of (1 + x) euros for every euro that the municipality spends on ac-
tual programs. The maximum contribution of the government should equal
(1 + x)Ung.
20
18 If we would assume that the national government ignores the indirect costs (see Foot-
note 15) while these costs do exist, then the national government would underestimate the
costs of programs and provide a larger grant. In that case, the municipality already would
not fully use the grant at a lower level of x (x̃ would be lower). Hence, the assumption
that the national government ignores the indirect costs leads sooner to the conclusion that
underspending exists than the assumption that its estimate of the indirect costs is correct.
19 The national government can compensate the crowding out of expenditures that the
municipality would do if there would not be a grant ((β/(1 + x)) − 1) by decreasing the
unconditional block grant for general expenditures (see Footnote 13) by this amount.
20 In reality, such a design might have a negative effect for the national government
that does not exist in our simple model. In the model, every euro that the municipality
spends on actual programs has the same indirect costs. Consequently, the municipality
first chooses the euro of programs with the highest revenue (like the national government
wants). However, if not every euro of programs has the same indirect costs (e.g., it requires
little effort for the municipality to provide an additional, but not effective, educational
program to a participant), then there is also an incentive for the municipality to choose a
euro of programs with low indirect costs and gain the difference between the reimbursed
indirect costs (x) and the real indirect costs.
14
4 Empiricism
In this section, we estimate municipalities’ indirect costs of welfare-to-work
programs. In the first subsection, we describe our data set and present
descriptive statistics. We bring the model from the previous section to the
data in the second subsection. In the third subsection, we present the results.
We perform a robustness check in the fourth subsection.
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment provided data on the grant
for welfare-to-work programs that a municipality annually receives and how
a municipality uses this money. We know the amount that a municipality
spends, how much it saves (or borrows), and the amount it gives back to the
national government.21 We have data for each municipality in the Nether-
lands over the period 2004 − 2008. Via Statistics Netherlands we obtained
annual municipality-specific data on the outflow from social assistance and
the population for the period 2004−2009 (both variables only contain people
aged between 20 and 65). During the sample period, some municipalities co-
operate regarding their welfare-to-work activities (in the period 2004− 2006,
there exist 16 partnerships of 64 mostly smaller municipalities (see Koning
(2009)). If two or more municipalities cooperate in a certain year, we con-
sider these municipalities as one decision maker and add their data for this
year. Moreover, some municipalities merge during the sample period. Until
the actual merger, we treat the merging municipalities as separate.
First, we present some descriptive statistics. For each municipality i in
year t, we divide its expenditures on actual programs (Ui,t), its savings (or
borrowings) (Si,t), and the amount it returns to the national government
(Ti,t) by the grant it receives (Gi,t). Figure 3 shows the results for 2006.
Figure B1, B2, B3, and B4 in Appendix B show the results for the other
years. Table 1 contains summary statistics. The figures show that many
municipalities do not use a substantial part of the grant they receive. For
example, in 2006, municipalities spend on average only 80% of the grant.
21 Possibly, municipalities also spend money from their own resources on actual welfare-
to-work programs. We do not observe these possible additional expenditures. However,
for a municipality there seems no reason to use its own resources if it has savings or if
it can still borrow. Table 1 shows that most municipalities have savings. Moreover, in
Section 3, we show that in theory a municipality never wants to spend more than the grant.
Therefore, we assume that municipalities do not spend money from their own resources
on actual programs (compare this assumption with Moffitt (1984)).
15
Figure 3: Expenditures (Ui,t), savings (or borrowings) (Si,t), and the amount














































































































































































































Figure 3 shows that there exist substantial differences between municipalities,
indicating that many municipalities spend less.22
The third and fifth row of Table 1 show that each year almost all mu-
nicipalities save and almost no municipalities borrow. In 2006, 397 out of
409 municipalities save and 12 borrow. Savings are substantial and increase
during the first years. Almost half of the municipalities save the maximum
allowed amount of 75% of the grant in 2006, while in 2004 about 10% of
the municipalities save this amount (see Table 1).23 The second row of Ta-
22 The annual amounts that a municipality spends, saves, and returns do not necessarily
add up to the grant it receives in that year since it may have savings from the past and/or
it may borrow from the national government. Hence, in a certain year, a municipality can
spend more than the grant it receives. Moreover, a municipality can return more than the
grant if its grant decreases compared to the previous year. In that case, it can save less
than in the previous year and therefore it is possible that it returns both the new grant
and a part of its savings from the past.
23 Most municipalities have some savings from 2003 (the final year of the previous
16
Table 1: Summary statistics
year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
no. of municipalities 461 429 409 442 434
average of Ui,t/Gi,t 0.81 0.75 0.80 0.92 0.98
no. of municipalities w. Si,t > 0 440 418 397 412 398
no. of municipalities w. Si,t = 0.75Gi,t 47 141 192 200 149
no. of municipalities w. Si,t < 0 21 11 12 30 36
no. of municipalities w. Ti,t > 0 47 140 192 200 148
average of Ti,t/Gi,t if Ti,t > 0 0.16 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.31
Note: The number of municipalities differs between years because of mergers and (tempo-
ral) partnerships.
ble 1 shows that on average municipalities’ expenditures increase over the
years. Municipalities spend on average 98% of the grant in 2008 (although
Figure B4 in Appendix B shows that still many municipalities do not fully
use the grant). One possible reason for the increase in expenditures over
time may be that for many municipalities it is not possible anymore to save
additional money in later years. However, municipalities do not only decide
to spend the grant in case saving is not possible. The figures show that many
municipalities return money to the national government as well. In 2006, al-
most 50% of the municipalities return money. The figures also show that if
a municipality returns money, then it can be a substantial part of the grant.
For example, this part is on average 29% of the grant in 2006 (see the sixth
and seventh row of Table 1).
Thus, many municipalities do not fully spend the grant, but instead
choose to partially save it and/or partially give it back. Apparently, for
these municipalities the profit of spending the final euro of the grant is lower
than the profit of saving this euro or giving it back. It is a priori not clear,
however, whether a municipality saves with the intention to use it in the
future or whether a municipality saves just because it did not reach the max-
imum allowed amount of savings yet (a municipality only returns the grant
if it is not possible to save anymore). In our first estimation of the indirect
costs of programs, we aim to make a distinction between these two motives of
saving and thus (implicitly) attach a value to savings (and borrowings). This
system), but these are for most municipalities much lower than the maximum allowed
amount of savings in 2004.
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setting is dynamic. Afterward, we estimate as a robustness check indirect
costs in a static setting by using the fact that saving a euro is not possible
anymore if a municipality already saves the maximum amount. In this case,
the value of savings does not impact a municipality’s marginal decision.
4.2 Setup
We adapt the model from Section 3 and model the decision of the municipal-
ity such that it can transfer money between years via saving and borrowing.
In this setup, a municipality can use a euro of the grant in three ways. First,
it can spend the euro. The gain of spending is that people leave social assis-
tance, but the cost is that the municipality has to pay the indirect costs of
programs from its own resources. Second, it can save the euro. In this case,
the gain is that the municipality can spend the euro in the future and later
expenditures may have a higher yield due to, for example, different economic
circumstances. Saving has no costs (similarly, a municipality can at no cost
borrow a euro to take advantage of a possible high current yield). Third, it
can give back the euro. In this case, there are no revenues and no costs.
The total revenues of expenditures on welfare-to-work programs of mu-
nicipality i in year t are:
TRi,t = benefitt · length · Zi,t (3)
where Zi,t is the number of persons that leave social assistance in municipality
i in year t due to its spending of Ui,t on actual welfare-to-work programs
(Ui,t ≥ 0). Moreover, benefitt is the amount of social assistance one recipient
receives in year t and length is the average number of years that a person
leaves social assistance. Thus, the total revenues are simply the amount of
money that a municipality saves on social assistance after spending Ui,t.
24
We specify Zi,t as follows:






where popi,t is the population of municipality i in year t and βt measures how
effective expenditures on actual programs are in year t. Since effectiveness
can differ between years, it may be attractive to save or borrow. Expenditures
24 A municipality may also provide additional income support (e.g., local tax waivers,
discounts on local services, and additional benefits for certain expenditures). We do not
take this support into account since it is often for everyone with a low income and a person
may still receive it after leaving social assistance. Moreover, the extent of this support is
relatively small.
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on programs have diminishing returns. We assume that expenditures only
impact outflow in the current year. This assumption seems realistic for some
types of programs (e.g., assistance with applications, wage subsidies, and
the creation of jobs), but may not be fully realistic for other types (e.g.,
education). However, the relation between current expenditures and future
outflow is a priori unclear. On the one hand, the relation might be positive
because of long-term effects of programs. On the other hand, the relation can
be negative if programs have locking-in effects (that is, program participants
decrease their efforts to find a job during the program) (see, e.g., Van Ours
(2004) and Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2008)). We implicitly
assume that these two effects cancel each other out (hereafter, we check this
assumption and it turns out that one effect does not always dominate the
other).
The total costs of welfare-to-work programs of a municipality are:
TCi,t = xiUi,t
where xi, the indirect costs of 1 euro of actual programs, differs between











where r is the discount rate. The profit consists of the difference between the
total revenues and total costs over the period 2004−2008 and the value of the
savings in 2008. The value of these savings is the gain of spending them after
2008 (or in case Si,2008 < 0, it is the future gain that the municipality sacrifices
by borrowing). The parameter y determines this value. A municipality wants
to maximize its profit given its budget constraint. The budget constraint is:
Gi,t + Si,t−1 = Ui,t + Si,t + Ti,t
where 0.75Gi,t ≥ Si,t ≥ −0.75Gi,t and Si,2003 is a constant. Moreover, Ti,t ≥ 0.
We estimate the indirect costs of 1 euro of actual programs in three
steps. First, we set values for the parameters benefitt, length, and r and
estimate the effectiveness of expenditures on actual programs (βt). Second,
we estimate the indirect costs of a municipality by evaluating numerically at
which level of xi the optimal choice of a municipality is most similar to the




First, we set values for benefitt, length, and r. We determine the value of
benefitt by dividing the total expenditures on social assistance benefits in
year t by the average of the number of people that receive social assistance
on the first and last day of that year (sources of these data are, respectively,
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and Statistics Netherlands).
This value is 12, 494 euros in 2008. We set length at 4 years. We know
that 25% (37%) of the population that enters social assistance also received
social assistance in the previous year (previous 2 years) (data from Statis-
tics Netherlands, see Inspectie Werk en Inkomen (2006) and Bierings and
Michiels (2010)). Therefore, we approximate the probability that a person
leaves social assistance and becomes a recipient again in the future by an ex-
ponential density function with a constant hazard function of 0.25 (value of
the CDF(year=1)=0.22, value of the CDF(year=2)=0.39). As a result, the
expected moment of inflow is 4 years after the moment of outflow (= 1/0.25).
The discount rate r is 0.05. Later on, we will also consider other values.
Second, we estimate βt via the following equation:
outflowi,t
popi,t







where outflowi,t is the outflow from social assistance in municipality i in
year t. The outflow that municipality i would have in year t in case it
would not spend anything on actual programs is the sum of the municipality-
specific fixed effect γi and the time-specific fixed effect δt (multiplied with its
population). We estimate Equation (4) via the two-way Within estimator.
Table 2 presents the main estimation results. The first column shows that
the yield of expenditures differs between years. The estimated coefficient for
2006 is about three times larger than the coefficient for 2008. The second
column presents the estimation results in case we do not include a year-
specific coefficient for the yield (βt = β). A Wald test rejects equality of the
point estimate of this pooled coefficient and the coefficient for 2006 (2008) at
the 5% (10%) significance level. To illustrate the results, Figure 4 shows the
relation between expenditures on actual welfare-to-work programs (Ui,t) and
the additional outflow that they cause (Zi,t) for a municipality with 80, 000
inhabitants. For example, this municipality would have an additional outflow
of 416 people if it would spend 7.5 million euros on actual programs in 2006.
If it would spend the same amount in 2008, only 143 persons would leave
social assistance. Furthermore, if this municipality already spent 7.5 million
euros in 2006 and if it wants one additional person to leave social assistance
in this year, then this would cost about 83, 000 euros. Thus, we find that the
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Table 2: Estimation results Equation (4)
dependent variable: outflowi,t/popi,t







Notes for Table 2, 3, and 4: For all regressions, N = 516, T = 5, and the number
of observations is 2, 185, except for the regression in the first column of Table 3 where
N = 491, T = 5, and the number of observations is 2, 125. Estimated coefficients are
multiplied with 1, 000 in Table 2 and 3 and with 100, 000 in Table 4. Standard errors that
are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are between brackets. Pesaran’s
CD test cannot reject the null of no cross-sectional dependence in the residuals at the
5% significance level. In these tables, * denotes 10% significance level, ** denotes 5%
significance level, and *** denotes 1% significance level. Municipality-specific fixed effects
and year-specific fixed effects are not reported.
Figure 4: Expenditures on actual programs (Ui,t) and the additional outflow






































β2004 −0.04 (0.25) 0.48 (0.52)
β2005 0.35 (0.20)* 0.59 (0.41)
β2006 −0.03 (0.18) 1.16 (0.41)***
β2007 −0.46 (0.21)** 0.79 (0.45)*
β2008 −0.87 (0.18)*** 0.35 (0.38)
yield differs between years. This difference can explain that municipalities
save.
Table 3 presents some robustness checks. The first column reports the
effect of expenditures on outflow in the next year. Remember that from a
theoretical perspective the relation between current expenditures and future
outflow can be both positive and negative. The results show that expendi-
tures in 2005 have a positive impact on outflow in 2006 (the positive effect of
programs dominates), while expenditures in 2007 and 2008 have a negative
impact on next year’s outflow (the locking-in effect dominates). One effect
does not always dominate the other effect. To control for a possible change in
the municipality-specific trend in the outflow after 2006, we perform a regres-
sion with 2 municipality-specific effects: one for the period 2004− 2006 and
one for the period 2007−2008. The second column of Table 3 reports similar
coefficients (with larger standard errors) as in case of 1 municipality-specific
effect (the first column of Table 2).
As a final robustness check (and to get coefficients with a simple interpre-











. The first column of Table 4
shows the estimation results. The pattern in the yield, which partly deter-
mines in which years it is attractive to save and spend, does not change. Like
in the basic specification, the yield is gradually increasing during the period
2004-2006 and declines gradually after 2006. The second column of the table
shows the results in case of a pooled coefficient. The interpretation of this co-
efficient is straightforward: it costs on average about 98, 000 euros on actual
programs to let one person leave social assistance (= 100, 000/1.02). A back-
of-the-envelope calculation based on this result indicates that municipalities
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Table 4: Robustness of estimation results (part 2)
dependent variable: outflowi,t/popi,t
explanatory variable: Ui,t/popi,t











benefit · length · 1
(100, 000/1.02)
= 0.50 (5)
where benefit is the average of benefitt during the sample period. This finding
is in line with studies that use detailed microdata to evaluate the effective-
ness of programs in the Netherlands (see Kok, Hollanders, and Hop (2006)
and CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (2007)). In
fact, policy makers also use this number for fiscal projections (Inspectie der
Rijksfinanciën (2010)).
4.3 Estimation of the indirect costs
We know all parameters of the model from Section 4.2, except xi and y.
Our interest is the average value of xi and we find this value by numerically
solving the model. We know the decisions of each municipality on Ui,t, Si,t,
and Ti,t during the sample period. We look for each municipality at which
level of the indirect costs these decisions maximize the municipality’s profit.
This level is the estimated xi of a municipality (x
e
i ). Subsequently, we take
the average of xei over all municipalities.
First, we set y = 0.5. This number means that the contribution of the
savings at the end of the sample (Si,2008) to the profit is 50% of their value.
Our back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that this percentage is approx-
imately the municipality’s return on money spent on actual programs (see
Equation (5)). Hereafter, we study to what extent our results depend on the
value of y (it turns out that it does not matter much).
Second, we take a municipality and construct paths of possible choices of
Ui,t, Si,t, and Ti,t during the period 2004− 2008. For each year, we calculate
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the maximum that this municipality can spend. This number is the sum of
the grant it receives, its balance from last year, and the maximum amount
that it can borrow. The municipality spends a fraction mi,t of this amount:
Ui,t = mi,t (Gi,t + Si,t−1 + 0.75Gi,t)
where mi,t is a value from the set {0, 0.05, 0.1, ..., 1} (21 different values).
When a municipality chooses Ui,t, it also chooses the amount it borrows or
does not spend. If it borrows (Ui,t > Gi,t + Si,t−1), then Si,t is the deficit
and Ti,t = 0. In case money remains (Ui,t < Gi,t + Si,t−1), saving it always
gives a higher profit than giving it back (both have no costs, but saving
has a possible revenue). Therefore, we only consider returning money as an
option if it is not possible anymore to save. If the amount of money that
remains after spending is equal to or less than 0.75Gi,t, then it is fully saved
and Ti,t = 0. If the amount of money that remains is more than 0.75Gi,t,
then Si,t = 0.75Gi,t and Ti,t is what remains after spending and saving. As
a consequence, when the municipality sets Ui,t, the values of Si,t and Ti,t
follow by definition. Therefore, in each year, the municipality can divide the
available amount of money in 21 different ways over Ui,t, Si,t, and Ti,t. The
available amount in year t depends on decisions in previous years. Hence, for
the 5-year period, there exist 215 (= 4, 084, 101) paths of possible choices.
Third, we set xi = 0. In this case, there are no indirect costs for the
municipality. Given this xi, we calculate the profit of all constructed paths
that the municipality can choose. The path with the highest profit is the
optimal decision for the municipality if xi = 0. We also calculate the optimal
decision in case one of the other values from the set {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 4} is the
value of xi. The set’s upper limit of 4 implies that a municipality has to add
at most 4 euros from its own resources to use 1 euro of the grant. For each of
the 41 possible values of xi, we have at least one path that would be optimal
for the municipality if this value of xi would be the real value (it is possible
that several paths generate the same maximum profit).
Fourth, we look which one of these (at least 41) optimal paths is most
similar to the real decisions of the municipality. The xi associated with this
path is the estimate of the indirect costs of this municipality. Formally,













Ti,t − T ∗i,t | xi
)2
(6)
If there are several optimal paths that are equally similar to the real decisions,
then xei is the average of the xi’s associated with these paths.
Fifth, we perform the analysis for all other municipalities of which the
24
Figure 5: The distribution of the estimated indirect costs of using 1 euro of






























































































data cover the full sample period (354 municipalities in total).25 Figure 5
shows the distribution of xei . The set’s upper limit of 4 seems sufficient. For
most municipalities, xei is larger than 0. The average x
e
i (x̄
e) is 0.93. This
number is the estimate of the indirect costs if y = 0.5.26
Finally, we repeat the complete analysis with each other value of y from
the set {0, 0.25, 0.5, ..., 2}. Thus, the value of Si,2008 is at least 0% and at
most 200%. Higher values do not seem realistic. The first column of Table 5
reports the results. The 9 different values of y do not cause a large variation
in the estimated indirect costs, although x̄e is somewhat higher for lower
values of y (in general, this is also true for xei ). If y = 0, then x̄
e = 1.00 and
if y = 2, then x̄e = 0.91. If savings in the final period have a lower value,
then it is more attractive to spend the grant. Therefore, indirect costs have
25 For a municipality with a relatively short sample period, the assumption on the value
of the savings in the final period is more important for determining its optimal decision.
26 We only interpret the average value of xei . Intuitively, we equal the marginal revenues
and marginal costs for each municipality. However, the effectiveness of spending (βt) is
an average revenue over all municipalities. As a result, we underestimate revenues, and
therefore indirect costs, for some municipalities, while we overestimate them for others.
Therefore, we focus on the average indirect costs. Since the effectiveness of spending has to
change over time to explain saving by municipalities, we cannot estimate the effectiveness
of spending for individual municipalities (moreover, we have only 5 years).
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Table 5: Estimated indirect costs of using 1 euro of the grant (x̄e) for different
values of the savings in 2008 (y): standard result and robustness checks
y standard result if r = 0.1 if length = 2 if length = 6
0 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.50
0.25 0.95 0.96 0.46 1.46
0.5 0.93 0.95 0.45 1.41
0.75 0.91 0.93 0.46 1.39
1 0.90 0.92 0.45 1.38
1.25 0.90 0.92 0.45 1.36
1.5 0.91 0.91 0.45 1.35
1.75 0.91 0.92 0.45 1.35
2 0.91 0.92 0.45 1.36
to be higher to explain that a municipality spends the same amount. The
distribution of xei is similar for all levels of y.
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We conclude that the estimated indirect costs are larger than 0. Results
do not depend too much on the value of y. For each euro of the grant that
a municipality spends, it has to add on average about 90 cents from its own
resources.28
Table 5 reports robustness checks as well. The second column of the
table shows the estimated indirect costs when the discount rate is 0.1. For
each level of y, x̄e is a bit higher than in case of r = 0.05. If the discount
rate increases, future gains become less important for a municipality. Thus,
saving becomes less attractive and spending in the current period becomes
more attractive. As a result, indirect costs have to be higher to explain why
a municipality spends the same part of the grant.
The third column of Table 5 reports results in case a person leaves social
assistance for only 2 years. In this case, we consider {0, 0.05, 0.1, ..., 2} as
possible values of xi (41 different values). For all values of y, x̄
e roughly
halves compared to the estimated value if length = 4. In case of y = 0.5, x̄e
27 If we only consider municipalities that have one optimal path that minimizes the
expression in Equation (6), then the estimated indirect costs are in general lower, but do
not differ much. For example, in case of y = 0.5, x̄e equals 0.87 (this value is the average
over 293 municipalities).
28 A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that this estimate is in the same range as
the part of the general unconditional block grant that the national government labels for
the indirect costs of social assistance and welfare-to-work programs (1.5 billion euros in
2008, see Footnote 13). According to our estimation, in 2008, municipalities need in total
about 1.4 billion euros to fully spend the grant of 1.6 billion euros (= 0.9 · 1.6).
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equals 0.45. Revenues from spending the grant halve if length = 2. Therefore,
spending is less attractive and the estimated indirect costs have to be lower
to explain why a municipality spends a similar amount. The fourth column
of Table 5 shows results in case length = 6. Here, possible values of xi are
{0, 0.15, 0.3, ..., 6} (41 values). The value of x̄e increases by roughly 50% for
all values of y. This finding makes sense as revenues of spending increase by
50%. Because spending the grant is more attractive, the indirect costs have
to be higher to explain why a municipality spends the same part of the grant.
Hence, x̄e is quite sensitive to the value of the variable length. However, even
if the value of length is only half of our best, data based, approximation, then
the indirect costs are still substantial.
4.4 Robustness check
The method that we use in the previous section (implicitly) attaches a value
to annual savings and borrowings. To check whether our results depend on
this aspect of our method, we also estimate the indirect costs in a setting
where additional savings and borrowings are not possible. In this static
setting, we can derive an analytical expression for the indirect costs.
The total revenues of expenditures on welfare-to-work programs of a mu-
nicipality are the same as before (see Equation (3)). The total costs of
welfare-to-work programs of a municipality are now:
TCi,t = xi,tUi,t
where the indirect costs of 1 euro of actual programs are municipality-specific
and year-specific.
In each year, a municipality allocates the available amount of money.
Per euro, it decides to spend the euro, save the euro, or give the euro back.
The municipality uses the euro for the purpose that generates the highest
marginal profit given the preliminary levels of Ui,t, Si,t, and Ti,t (that is, given
the allocation of the euros on which it already decided in that year). As we
argue in Section 4.3, saving a euro always gives a higher marginal profit than
returning that euro. The marginal profit of saving a euro is equal to or larger
than 0, while the marginal profit of returning a euro is 0. Therefore, until
the municipality has saved the maximum allowed amount, it only considers
to use or save the euro that it has to allocate. If it is not possible anymore to
save (Si,t = 0.75Gi,t), then the municipality considers to use the euro or to
give it back. This latter assessment is static as its outcome does not impact
27





) ∣∣∣∣ (Si,t = 0.75Gi,t)
=
benefitt · length · popi,t · βt
Ui,t + popi,t
− xi,t (7)
This marginal profit decreases if Ui,t increases, while the marginal profit of
returning money is independent of the level of Ti,t.
Hence, if we observe in the data that in a certain year a municipality saves
the maximum allowed amount (Si,t = 0.75Gi,t), spends money (Ui,t > 0), and
returns money (Ti,t > 0), then we know that this municipality assessed spend-
ing and returning. Moreover, we know that at lower levels of Ui,t the marginal
profit of spending a euro is higher than the marginal profit of returning the
euro, while at higher levels of Ui,t the opposite is true (i.e., there is no corner
solution).
Therefore, in this year, this municipality has chosen its expenditure level
such that the marginal profit of spending (Equation (7)) equals the marginal
profit of returning (0). Thus, at the Ui,t we observe, it holds that:
xi,t =
benefitt · length · popi,t · βt
Ui,t + popi,t
Next to Ui,t, we also know all other variables at the right hand side of this
expression. As a result, we can calculate xi,t for all municipalities i in year
t with Si,t = 0.75Gi,t, Ui,t > 0, and Ti,t > 0. In total, there are 727 of such
observations for 297 different municipalities.
Figure 6 shows the result. Also this simple method shows that the es-
timated indirect costs are larger than 0. The average value of xi,t is 1.73.
Thus, according to this method, it costs a municipality on average 1.73 euros
to spend 1 euro of the grant. For most observations, the estimated value is
lower than 6. If we exclude the 19 (48) estimated values that are larger than
6 (4), then the average value is 1.55 (1.41). The estimated indirect costs
are higher than in the dynamic setting. This result makes sense since in the
static setting we only estimate indirect costs of municipalities in years that
they return money to the national government. Naturally, municipalities re-
turn money if they have high indirect costs. Given this issue, the level of the
estimated indirect costs seems more or less comparable. Results from the
previous section appear to be robust.29
29 The estimated xi,t is robust to the existence of additional indirect fixed costs since
these costs would not have an impact on the marginal profit of spending.
28




































































































Note: The figure does not contain the 3 highest values (10.34, 13.10, and 22.45).
5 Conclusion
Dutch municipalities receive a conditional block grant for welfare-to-work
programs. Since municipalities pay for social assistance, spending this grant
seems very attractive for them. However, many municipalities do not use a
large part of their grant. This paper studies why this is the case. As such,
it offers a different perspective on intergovernmental grants. Current papers
focus on how recipients spend grants. We consider the option that recipients
do not fully use their grant.
We emphasize that municipalities can only use the conditional block grant
for expenditures of which they can prove that they were done for the purpose
of the grant. Municipalities have to pay other, more indirect expenditures
from their own resources. We argue that if the indirect costs of programs
are sufficiently high, then it is not attractive for municipalities to fully spend
the grant. Normally, the national government does not know these costs
exactly. With the help of our model and municipality-specific data on grants
and expenditure levels, we estimate the costs of using the grant. We find
that municipalities have to add on average about 90 cents from their own
resources to spend 1 euro of the grant. Naturally, policy makers should not
29
take this number too literally as it depends on our model and the value of
some parameters in this model (like the spell of work after leaving social
assistance). Moreover, other possible explanations that we do not include in
our model (like careful budgeting by municipalities and disappointing results
of programs of which the price depended on job placements) can also impact
this number. Our main message is that the indirect costs are larger than 0
and thus impact municipalities’ behavior.
Next to the grant that we study, also many other conditional block grants
involve some kind of indirect costs (see, e.g., the examples in the introduc-
tion). These costs have an impact on recipients’ behavior and policy makers
should take them into account when they design a grant. The method that
we introduce in this paper could help researchers and policy makers to esti-
mate the often hidden indirect costs. Moreover, also matching grants often
have, next to the known explicit matching requirement, an implicit matching
component (see Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990)). Therefore, indirect costs
may also explain why recipients do not use a matching grant as intensively
as a donor wishes. An example of closed-ended matching grants of which
policy makers worry whether recipients use them sufficiently are the Euro-
pean Structural and Cohesion Funds (Marzinotto (2011)). Recipients do not
use billions of euros of these grants (see, e.g., Court of Auditors (2004, p. 53
and p. 59) and Court of Auditors (2005, p. 50)). Possibly, indirect costs
are an important factor. Recently, for example, the European Commission
recommended Italy to invest in administrative capacity in order to be able to
receive more money from the Cohesion Fund (European Commission (2011b,
p. 7), see also Milio (2007)). Also Verheijen (2007) mentions the adminis-
trative capacity in Central European and Baltic countries as a constraint for
using the Structural Funds. Via our method, researchers and policy makers
can estimate the real matching rate of these matching grants as well.
Finally, theory on intergovernmental grants suggests to use open-ended
matching grants to internalize spillover benefits (Oates (1999)). Researchers
have wondered why conditional block grants and closed-ended matching
grants occur frequently in practice while there is no justification for them
in standard economic theory (see, e.g., Oates (1999), Huber and Runkel
(2006), and Smart and Bird (2009)). The conditional block grant that we
study is de facto a closed-ended matching grant because it has an implicit
matching component. Moreover, since many municipalities do not fully use
their grant, they would set the same expenditure level if the grant would
be open-ended (that is, if it would be an infinite conditional block grant).
Therefore, on a closer examination, standard economic theory does help to
understand the design of the grant that we study.
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Appendix A: Optimal level of the grant
From Proposition A1 below follows that G = Ung is the optimal level of the con-
ditional block grant for the national government. The intuition behind this result
is as follows. If G = Ung, then the municipality chooses the expenditure level that
the national government wants or a lower level. A lower grant can only give an
incentive to decrease expenditures. A higher grant can give an incentive to in-
crease expenditures, but only if the current level of the grant is the only binding
restriction for the municipality. If the municipality does not fully use the grant if
G = Ung (i.e., it spends less than the national government wants), then a higher
grant does not have any effect because the level of the indirect costs obstructs
higher expenditures.
Proposition A1. If G 6= Ung, then the difference between the expenditure level
that the municipality sets and Ung is always larger than or equal to this difference
in case of G = Ung.
Proof. Suppose that G = h = ((α+ w)/(1 + x)) − 1, where w is a constant that
determines how much h differs from Ung. Define x̊ as the highest level of x at




α− β + w
We divide the alternatives that the national government has for h = Ung (i.e., set
w = 0) in 3 categories:
1. h > Ung (i.e., set w > 0). In this case, x̊ < x̃. There exist two scenarios. First,
we consider the scenario x ≤ x̊. The municipality uses the whole grant: U∗ = h
(see the left panel of Figure A1). The municipality never spends more than h
since Equation (2) always holds. If G = h, then Equation (2) is equivalent to:
w ≥ β − α (A1)
where 0 > β − α. Since the grant is higher than what the municipality would
spend if there would not be a grant, it is never attractive to spend more than
the grant as from then the municipality has to bear the full marginal costs.
If G = Ung, then U
∗ = Ung (if x ≤ x̊, then it is also true that x ≤ x̃). Since
h > Ung, the chosen U differs more from Ung if G = h than if G = Ung.
Second, we consider the scenario x > x̊. The municipality chooses U such that
MRm = MC
G
m and therefore U
∗ = (β/x)− 1. If G = Ung and x ≤ x̃, then
U∗ = Ung. Since (β/x)− 1 ≥ Ung if x ≤ x̃, the difference between the U that
the municipality chooses and Ung is larger than or equal to this difference if
G = h. If G = Ung and x > x̃, then U
∗ = (β/x)− 1. Hence, in this case the
chosen U is similar in case of G = Ung and G = h.
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Figure A1: Examples of the municipality’s decision if the grant differs from
the expenditure level that the national government wishes (G 6= Ung)
MC MCGm if G = Ung MC
G
























2. Ung > h > (β/(1 + x))− 1 (i.e., set 0 > w > β − α). In this case, x̊ > x̃.
Again, there exist two scenarios. First, it can be that x ≤ x̊. The municipal-
ity uses the full grant: U∗ = h. The municipality never spends more than h
(since Equation (A1) holds). If G = Ung and x ≤ x̃, then U∗ = Ung. Hence,
the chosen U differs more from Ung if G = h. If G = Ung and x > x̃, then
U∗ = (β/x)− 1 < Ung. Since h ≤ (β/x)− 1 if x ≤ x̊, the U that the munici-
pality chooses differs at least as much from Ung if G = h.
The second scenario is x > x̊. In this scenario, the municipality does not fully
use the grant, it sets U∗ = (β/x)− 1. If G = Ung, then U∗ = (β/x)− 1 (if
x > x̊, then it is also true that x > x̃). Thus, the municipality chooses the
same U in both cases.
3. (β/(1 + x)) − 1 ≥ h ≥ 0 (i.e., set β − α ≥ w ≥ (1 + x) − α). In this case,
x̊ is not defined. The municipality always chooses U∗ = (β/(1 + x))− 1 (see
the right panel of Figure A1). It chooses the same level as it would do if
there would not be a grant. The grant is too low to have an impact on the
decision of the municipality. If G = Ung and x ≤ x̃, then U∗ = Ung. Since
(β/(1 + x))− 1 < Ung, the municipality chooses a U that differs more from Ung
than the U it chooses in case of G = Ung (the right panel of Figure A1 shows
this outcome). If G = Ung and x > x̃, then U
∗ = (β/x)− 1 < Ung. It follows
that (β/(1 + x))− 1 < (β/x)− 1.
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Appendix B: Additional figures
Figure B1: Expenditures (Ui,t), savings (or borrowings) (Si,t), and the















































































































































































































Figure B2: Expenditures (Ui,t), savings (or borrowings) (Si,t), and the















































































































































































































Figure B3: Expenditures (Ui,t), savings (or borrowings) (Si,t), and the















































































































































































































Figure B4: Expenditures (Ui,t), savings (or borrowings) (Si,t), and the
amount returned (Ti,t) divided by the grant received (Gi,t) for each munici-
pality in 2008
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